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Public Policy Towards the Sale of State Assets in Troubled Times: 
Lessons from the Irish Experience 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Governments throughout the western world and beyond are in the midst of a 
severe financial crisis and emerging from a sharp recession.  Ireland is no exception, 
indeed its banking crisis and economic performance are amongst the worst.  
Eliminating the structural deficit – by some estimates 5-7% of Irish GDP, through a 
judicious combination of expenditure reductions and tax increases is vital to ensuring 
sound public finances.  As part of this process Ireland is considering privatising some 
of the tangible and intangible assets that the state owns.  The Review Group of State 
Assets and Liabilities was established in July 2010 by the Minister of Finance “to 
examine and provide advice on the proper stewardship of state assets and on 
opportunities for better use of those assets.”1  
The sale of state assets is likely to be an option considered not only by the 
Irish government but also by other national governments.  However, prior to any 
decision to sell state assets careful consideration needs to be given to wider issues 
than maximising revenue from asset sales. State-owned assets in Ireland and other 
countries are frequently of considerable economic and strategic importance.  The 
commercial state-owned firms in Ireland, for example, control the major airports, 
urban and, to a lesser extent, inter-urban bus travel, ports, railways, electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution, gas distribution and supply, postal services, 
TV and radio broadcasting, forestry and solid fuel production.  In terms of intangible 
assets, the State creates and is responsible for allocating radio spectrum for 
broadcasting and telecommunications, mineral, hydrocarbon and other licences, and 
carbon dioxide emission permits.2 Furthermore, the State and organisations close to 
the State provide a wide range of services, some of which primarily serve private 
                                                 
1 Taken from Department of Finance website: http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=6396.  
Accessed 29 July 2010.   
2 An interim list of assets to be reviewed by the Group includes 28 commercial state bodies and three 
classes or types of intangible assets.  For details see source in previous footnote. Aer Lingus is not 
listed, but it is obviously a state-owned asset whose value could be quickly realised. In other 
jurisdictions, such as England, water utilities are privately-owned commercial firms, but publicly 
regulated.  Hence there is an argument for inclusion of both Aer Lingus and water utilities in the assets 
reviewed by the Group.  
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interests.  The brand and expertise of such bodies should be seen as intangible assets 
too. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss what factors should be taken into 
account, what questions should be asked, in deciding which state assets should be 
sold, the regulatory and other mechanisms that might be introduced to complement 
such asset sales, and some of the difficulties that are likely to be experienced in 
conducting assets sales.  Although the focus of the paper is on the Irish experience, 
the lessons have, we believe, wider applicability. 
In Section 2 of the paper the terms of reference that might be given to a task 
force or departmental committee set up to consider which assets should be privatised 
are considered.  Attention then turns to the types of factors that need to be taken into 
account in the selection for sale of tangible assets (Section 3), before attention turns to 
intangible assets in Section 4.  A conclusion completes the submission (Section 5).   
 
2. Setting the Right Framework: Terms of Reference 
It is important to set the correct framework within which to analyze the sale of 
state assets.  This framework should ideally take into account wider public policy 
considerations relating to competition, efficiency, resource allocation and economic 
development.  These wider considerations reflect the fact that the purpose of public 
policy should be to maximise societal welfare and a narrow focus on maximising 
revenue from the sale of state assets, particularly tangible assets, is likely to fail to 
adequately to reflect these issues.  
The method chosen in Ireland to frame the debate was the creation of a review 
group to draw up a list of potential asset sales.  Its terms of terms can be therefore be 
seen as framing the debate and depending on their scope and content as a suitable 
model to be employed elsewhere.  Even if a review group is not created, the terms of 
reference could inform internal thinking within a finance department or subsequent 
consideration by a parliamentary committee.  
The terms of reference for the Review Group of State Assets and Liabilities 
(“the Group”) are as follows: 
• To consider the potential for asset disposals in the public sector, including 
commercial state bodies, in view of the indebtedness of the State.  
• To draw up a list of possible asset disposals.  
• To assess how the use and disposition of such assets can best help restore 
growth and contribute to national investment priorities.  
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• To review where appropriate, relevant investment and financing plans, 
commercial practices and regulatory requirements affecting the use of such 
assets in the national interest. 
 
There is a clear preference for asset sales as a method of helping to resolve the 
indebtedness of the State.  However, in considering asset sales the terms of reference 
suggest, quite properly, that wider considerations need to be taken into account.  
Drawing up a list of potential assets disposals implies setting criteria as to which 
assets should be sold.  Furthermore, the terms of reference suggest that the asset sales 
should not only assist in resolving indebtedness, but also “help restore growth and 
contribute to national investment policies.”  Finally, the terms of reference list a series 
of factors that may need to be taken into account when considering the use to which 
these assets are put.  In sum, the terms of reference can be read as the maximisation of 
income from asset sales subject to a series of important wider public policy 
constraints.  This is a sensible framework that permits consideration of the wider 
considerations identified above. 
 
3. Tangible Assets: Commercial State-Owned Firms. 
Introduction  
Selling state assets is nothing new in Ireland, or in many other countries, 
particularly since the 1980s led by the UK (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). The 
importance of state-owned firms in Ireland has declined, both in absolute and relative 
terms, since the early 1990s, due to a combination of privatisation and the growth in 
the economy.3  In the early 1980s state-owned firms employed 91,000 persons, 
accounting for 8 per cent of total employment in the economy; by 2008 employment 
declined to 41,000 persons in state-owned firms accounting for 2 per cent of total 
employment in the economy.4 The State exited ownership involvement in banking,5 
telecommunications, steel, shipping and sugar refining.  Nevertheless, what remains, 
as noted above, is state involvement in important sectors of the economy, some of 
which are competitive, others oligopolistic or monopolistic. 
                                                 
3 For discussion see, for example, Palcic and Reeves (2004). 
4 Based on Barrington (1985, p. 289) and Forfas (2010, p. 3).  The latter source contains an extensive 
discussion on the importance of state-owned firms to the economy. 
5 Until that is the financial crisis resulted in the State taking ownership in whole or in part in several 
banks.  
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 In considering which state-owned firms might be appropriately privatised, it is 
important to first examine the rationale for public ownership.  If there are no strong or 
compelling reasons for public ownership, then the state-owned firm could be disposed 
of through privatisation.  However, that is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition 
for privatisation.  Attention has to be paid to the way in which the state-owned firm is 
privatised, especially when it has market power, to ensure that complementary 
policies are introduced so that the firm is subject to appropriate checks and balances.  
Even if these conditions are met there may be further barriers to successful 
privatisation which also need to be considered.     
Why Government Ownership? 
In considering whether or not a state-owned firm should be transferred to the 
private sector an important set of issues revolve around why the state-owned firm is in 
the public as opposed to the private sector.  Thus the following questions need to be 
addressed: 
• What purpose or rationale was there for the creation of the state-owned firm? 
• Is that purpose or objective still relevant today? 
• Will the transfer of the firm to the private sector damage the attainment of the 
objectives of public ownership? 
• Are there better or more effective methods or instruments that could be used to 
attain those objectives? 
Many state-owned firms were created many decades ago such as the Electricity 
Supply Board (“ESB”) in 1927, Bord na Mona in 1946, or Córas Iompair Éireann ("C 
IE"),6 in 1950 (Barrington, 1985, Appendix 1, pp. 308-311).  Furthermore, in some 
instances, since the state-owned firm was created it has increased the range of 
activities in which it is involved.  For example, while Bord na Mona was initially 
concerned with peat mining, it entered commercial and domestic waste management 
in 2007 with the acquisition of AES, which increased Bord na Mona’s revenue by 20 
per cent from activities in Ireland.7  
The rationale as to why these activities were and are conducted within the 
public sector may no longer be relevant or valid and/or there may be better ways of 
attaining the objective.  This may reflect technological change (e.g., the market has 
                                                 
6 CIE is responsible for the state’s bus and rail services through separate companies. For details see 
http://www.cie.ie/about_us/chairmans_statement.asp.  Accessed 10 September 2010. 
7 For details see Competition Authority (2007). 
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expanded so much that there is room for many suppliers and thus the monopoly 
rationale for the state-owned firm is no longer valid); institutional reform (e.g., public 
private partnerships may be a much more appropriate and efficient procurement 
method than direct provision through state ownership); and, changes in ideology (e.g., 
a move away from a belief in protectionism, autarky and a distrust of the private 
sector towards reliance on a liberal open trading system and the efficacy of markets).8   
 Of course, this discussion assumes that the rationale(s) for public ownership is 
carefully specified in publicly available documents and, where there is more than one 
rationale, no conflicts occur.  It also assumes that when a state-owned firm diversifies 
its activities – such as Bord na Mona in the above example – a similar exercise is 
conducted.  Finally, it assumes that that there is no disparity between the publicly-
stated rationale and the underlying or ‘real’ rationale.  In the case of Bord na Mona 
while the stated rationale for intervention is security of supply,9 arguable job creation 
is as, if not more, important motivation.10  It is not at all obvious that these conditions 
will always be met.  Hence discovering why an activity is in the public realm is likely 
to be neither easy nor straightforward. 
 To some degree, however, this may not be an insuperable problem.  In 
determining whether there is a valid rationale it is suggested that market failure 
framework be used.  After all what is being compared are the merits of the public and 
the private sector.  The framework is well developed and has been suggested by other 
commentators such as Forfas (2010, pp. 21-22) in the current debate over the role of 
state-owned firms.   Nevertheless, there may be differences between the stated 
rationale for public ownership and those consistent with the market failure 
framework.  The stated reasons reflect political decisions, where arguably concerns 
about re-election are uppermost, while the market failure approach is more about what 
politicians should do in order to maximise societal welfare (Gorecki, 2009). 
The market failure framework suggests that following rationales for government 
intervention:11 
                                                 
8 This change in view is consistent with the record in Ireland.  See Barrett (2004) for a discussion on 
this point. 
9 This rationale is discussed further below. 
10 Indeed, Honohan (1997, p. 105) comments that peat-based electricity generation “can best be 
rationalised as an income redistribution measure.”  Peat mining is of course an essential input into such 
generation. 
11 For a discussion of this framework, in the context of EU Structural Funds, see Honohan (1997, pp. 
75-92). 
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• Monopoly, combined with high barriers to entry, so that the firm has market 
power which can be used to raise prices above costs.  Prices are too high with 
the result that consumers are worst off, either because they cannot purchase 
the product at the competitive level (due to a budget constraint) or they 
purchase the product but at too high a price; 
• Externalities, prices are meant to reflect costs, but not all costs may be 
included in the price, such as the polluting activities of a factory or the noise 
imposed by an aircraft or highway vehicles on nearly residents;  the water or 
air may be ‘free’ to the firm whereas it should be priced, with the result that 
there will be too much pollution and noise and water resources will be 
overexploited; 
• Imperfect or asymmetric information, in that the seller or provider of a service 
or product possess knowledge not available to the buyer and that can be used 
to distort the buyers choice.  Information can be provided to rectify the 
asymmetry;  
• Public goods; that is, goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-
rivalry means that consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce 
availability of the good for consumption by others; and non-excludability that 
no one can be effectively excluded from using the good. Examples often cited 
include security of supply (e.g. energy), clean air, free-to-air television, 
defence and lighthouses.12  Because the private sector will under provide such 
goods, because of the difficult of recouping the cost of provision, government 
could, for example, subsidise the activity or provide directly or under contract. 
These rationales, of course, only provide grounds for government intervention.  They 
do not specify how the government should intervene.  There is an extensive literature 
on the choice of instrument - public enterprise or tax or the creation of a property right 
or regulation or incorporation within a government department or a subsidy.13    
 Broadly speaking the result of the exercise examining why a firm is part of the 
public sector should result in state-owned firms being divided into three broad 
categories:  
                                                 
12 However, it is not at all clear that lighthouses fall into this category.  For a discussion, which refers 
to the experience of Great Britain and Ireland see Coase (1974). 
13 See for example, Trebilcock et al (1982) and Gorecki (2009). 
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• those state-owned firms for which the stated rationale, whether or not it 
accords with the market failure framework set out above, is no longer relevant 
and valid and hence consideration can be given for privatisation.  For 
example, Bord na Mona’s peat mining for use in electricity generation may 
have been justified on grounds of security of supply, given Ireland’s reliance 
in imported fuels.14 However, this rational may no longer be tenable, because 
of concerns about the environment – carbon dioxide emissions from peat are 
very high;  and competitiveness – peat is high cost typically necessitating an 
annual surcharge on all electricity consumer (e.g. €78 million in 2010/11); 
while security of supply concerns are being addressed by other policy 
instruments – interconnection with Great Britain and the development of off-
shore gas resources;15  
• those stated-owned firms for which the objectives, whether or not it accords 
with the market failure framework, can be met by more efficiently and 
effectively through the use of alternative policy instruments.  For example, 
while urban bus services might have been run as a state-owned firm in order to 
assure supply and avoid inefficiencies/congestion with multiple providers on 
the same route, a better, more cost effective and flexible method of provision 
could be for a public authority to design the network of routes required but use 
competitive tendering to determine which firm would provide the service for a 
particular routes.  Under this model the state-owned enterprise could compete 
for the right to supply the service, but would be competing against other 
suppliers.  Such a tendering system has been used to determine, for example, 
which firm should operate the LUAS in Dublin;16 and, 
                                                 
14 This interpretation is consistent with DCMNR (2007), EC (2001), and ESB (2005). 
15 For a discussion on these points see Tuohy et al (2009) and CER (2010).  If a peat fired generating 
station’s notified entitled costs are greater than its revenues then a surcharge – the Public Service 
Obligation – is levied; if its costs are less than its revenues, the difference is returned to the PSO fund.  
Typically it appears that monies are not returned. 
16 Another example might be ports, most of which are in public ownership.  This is justified by 
reference to the fact that they are “essential pieces of national infrastructure and as such have a 
strategic role in facilitating both national and regional economic development” (Department of 
Transport, 2010, p. 7) and the need to “ensure that … wider socio-economic interests are protected” 
(ibid, p. 9).  However, arguably the same applies to Eircom and airlines, both of which are largely, if 
not entirely, in private hands.  Furthermore in the 1990s (Industrial Policy Review Group, 1992, pp. 45-
46) and in the 2000s (Competition Authority, 2003, p. 3) concerns were expressed about the lak of 
competitiveness of Irish ports, which retarded rather than promoted economic development.  As a 
result some attention is required as to why ports cannot be privatised, particularly the larger ones, and 
why these development and socio-economic interests – whatever they might be – cannot be 
safeguarded through other means.  
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• those state-owned firms for which the objectives are best met through public 
ownership.  The electricity and gas transmission and distribution networks are 
natural monopoly and there are arguably grounds for these remaining in public 
ownership. 
The remainder of the discussion below discusses the factors that need to be taken into 
account in considering the first two options.17   
Of course, it should be noted that it is possible that a large state-owned firm 
that is diversified and/or vertically integrated may as a result of this exercise be split 
up, with some parts remaining in the public sector and others in the private sector.  It 
might be argued that the ESB, for example, was established as a public firm because 
of the need to control a monopoly supplier of electricity and in order to ensure rural 
electrification which might not otherwise be provided.  However, electricity 
generation is rapidly becoming more competitive with entry of new generators and 
interconnection with other markets, with only transmission and distribution as a 
natural monopoly.  Furthermore, the creation of the independent regulator, the 
Commission for Energy Regulation, addresses the problem of controlling the 
monopoly power that remains in the incumbent ESB.  Indeed, a separate entity, 
EirGrid, controls and operates and will soon, unless government policy changes, own 
the transmission system, separate from ESB. Hence arguably, ESB generation 
activities could be privatised while the natural monopoly could remain within the 
public sector.    
Structurally Competitive vs Oligopolies/Monopolies 
The owner of a firm, whether in the public or private sector, monitors its 
performance and sets its goals and objectives, such as maximising profits or a profits 
break even target.  Of course, in the private sector where the ownership of the firm 
may be widely held, management may play a larger role in setting policy, subject, of 
course, to the market for corporate control.18 Irrespective of whether or not the firm is 
part of the private or public sector, competitors will also impose constraints on the 
firm’s behaviour, the strength of which depends on market characteristics.  If the 
market has many competitors, with low barriers to entry, then any one firm is likely to 
                                                 
17 A thorough review of state-owned firms would consider governance and other issues related to the 
third category.  For a discussion of these issues see Forfas (2010). 
18 Mergers and acquisitions; the argument is that if firms become inefficient and/or do not maximise 
profits then another firm will acquire them and remove the inefficiency and maximise profits.  For a 
discussion of the market for corporate control see Manne (1965). 
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have little market power.  Its competitors place constraints on its pricing and other 
dimensions of business behaviour.  At the other extreme, if the firm is a monopoly in 
a market with high barriers to entry, then the firm will have market power, potentially 
at least, to charge prices above costs and generate excess profits which can be used for 
various purposes.  In the latter case, with the state as owner, can in theory at least, 
constrain the pricing behaviour of the firm while if the firm were in the private sector 
it is much more likely to raise price above competitive levels. 
This is, of course, very much a stylised picture of reality.  In some structurally 
competitive markets such as inter-urban bus transport it is arguable that the market 
has not been competitive as they could be precisely because barriers to entry have 
been raised by restrictive licensing by government to protect the incumbent state-
owned firm from competition.19  A recent example was the behaviour of the Minister 
for Transport with respect to licensing decisions biased in favour of Dublin Bus at the 
expense of a private bus operator, the Swords Express.20  Further in some of these 
markets the State is able to provide large levels of funding for firms that in part at 
least are involved in competition.  CIE, for example, received a subsidy of €316 
million in 2009, equivalent to 43 per cent of its revenue (CIE, 2010, p. 8).21 The bus 
subsidy runs for 5 years and was not put out to tender.22  
Equally, a firm – irrespective or whether or not it is publicly or privately 
owned - with market power may use some of that power to earn supra normal profits, 
some of which may be dissipated in various forms of activity.  When privately owned 
it might be used for corporate expenses and perks; in the public sector to keep open 
factories in a Minister’s constituency in the 1980s23 or to diversify into activities that 
may be politically popular but make little or no commercial or perhaps even 
                                                 
19 Of course, this point should not be overstated as there are a litany of examples of the state supplying 
restrictive regulation to protect private firms.  For a discussion see Gorecki (2009, 2010) and OECD 
(2001). 
20 For details see High Court, Digital Messenger Limited Trading As Swords Express and Minister for 
Transport and Dublin Bus [2010] IEHC 311, delivered on 30 July 2010.  This judgment may be 
accessed    
http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/bce24a8184816f1580256ef30048ca50/8f959bc0e75602c88025778
b003de28d?OpenDocument.  Accessed 7 September 2010.  
21 The subsidy consists of a Public Service Obligation and Rail Safety Grant.  The PSO was agreed 
with the bus services of CIE for five years, for rail for 10 years dating from December 2009.   
22 Another example is what Barrett (2006) refers to as the regulatory capture by the formerly 100% 
publicly-owned Aer Lingus of its parent department that over many decades refused to allow new 
entrants to compete with the national flag carrier until Ryanair was allowed to operate in 1986.  
23 On this see Sweeney (1960, p. 101). 
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environmental sense (e.g., the promotion of electric cars by the ESB) or to allow 
monopoly rents to be captured in the form of higher labour costs (e.g. ESB).24     
Nevertheless, the above characterisation does contain sufficient traction to 
provide some guidance as to the considerations that might be entertained when a 
state-owned firm is sold into the private sector.  Essentially there should be 
complementary policies designed to ensure that the formerly state-owned firm should 
not be able to exercise market power and that as far as possible market forces should 
be used to allocate resources and set prices.  This prevents the privatisation process 
from being nothing more than a transfer of a firm with market power from the public 
to the private sector.  Such an approach has the advantage that it is consistent with the 
terms of reference for the Group which refer to helping restore growth and regulatory 
requirements.  In order to ensure that resources are allocated as much as possible 
consistent with market forces the following options and considerations are 
recommended. 
Break-up state-owned firms into monopoly and competitive parts where feasible.   
If there are substantial economies of scope or vertical complementarities such an 
approach may be unduly costly.  However, where this is not the case - arguably in the 
case of ESB discussed above - then such separation should be seriously considered. 
The competitive parts can be privatised and market forces will be sufficient to 
monitor performance while the monopoly element can be regulated.  By engaging in 
this separation it makes the role of the regulator much easier since it precludes the 
monopolist from diverting profits into the competitive parts of the business or using 
the security of the regulated asset to engage in risky activities in other sectors of the 
economy.  As noted above the ESB would be an instance where such restructuring 
could take place prior to privatisation.  Another possible example would be the 
introduction of terminal competition at Dublin Airport, whereby each of the two 
terminals could be privatised but sold to different owners, or alternatively the 
terminals could be retained in public ownership but operating the terminals could be 
franchised out through a tendering process.25.  
                                                 
24 On the latter point see Deloitte (2005, p. 10, p. 48, p. 224) and Diffney et al (2009, p. 481).  The 
former source finds that labour costs in ESB are between 20 and 30 % above comparable UK 
generators.  
25 Serious consideration was given to establishing a second terminal at Dublin Airport to compete with 
existing facilities (Panel, 2003), but this did not go ahead.  On terminal competition see CAA (2005) 
which had previously been sceptical concerning airport terminal competition and CC (2009) which 
considers terminal competition in the context of BAA plc. 
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Remove unnecessary entry and other restrictions used to protect the incumbent state-
owned firm.   
To the extent that entry and other regulations are used to protect a state-owned 
firm from competition, as arguably is the case in urban and to a lesser extent inter-
urban bus services, then these restrictions should be abolished as part and parcel of 
any transfer of assets to the private sector.  Of course, abolition of such restrictions 
should be part of any sensible policy to improve the efficiency of the economy, 
irrespective of the ownership issue.  While some steps have been made in this 
direction on foot of the OECD (2001) report on this issue and a series of reports on 
the professions by the Competition Authority,26 much remains to be done as discussed 
elsewhere in this paper in specific instances. 
Competition for the market rather than competition in the market.   
In some instances the problems created by a monopoly situation, based on 
economies of scale, scope and/or density can be resolved by instituting competition 
for the market through a tendering procedure, rather than the creation of a regulatory 
agency to supervise competition in the market.  A good example of competition for 
the market is household waste collection, where the evidence suggests that contracting 
out the right to collect such waste secures the lowest price, compared to a situation of 
an unregulated state-owned monopolist (Competition Authority, 2002). Recent 
government policy announcements are moving towards tendering for waste collection 
(DoEHLG, 2010, pp. 13-14).  Franchising bus routes is another example.  In 2002 the 
Minister for Transport announced that 25% of the bus routes in Dublin would be 
franchised from 2004 with the implication of more to follow (Department of 
Transport, 2002, pp. 5-6).  However, despite compelling arguments27 for such a move, 
by 2010 there were no franchised routes.  
Regulation as a last resort.   
Where none of the above measures to introduce competition are likely to be 
successful and the firm has market power then the firm should be subject to 
regulation.  There are many examples of regulatory structures in Ireland to select from 
in coming to a view as to which is the most appropriate model to follow.  Indeed, in 
most cases the state-owned firm is already subject to regulation such as ESB and Bord 
Gais by the Commission of Energy Regulation, which begs the obvious question that 
                                                 
26 Full details may be found on the Competition Authority’s website: www.tca.ie. 
27 See, for example, Massey (2007). 
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if the original motivation for public ownership was to control the monopoly problem, 
why is both state ownership and regulation necessary? Given the necessity of 
independent regulation under EU Directives and Regulations relating, to for example, 
telecommunications, gas and electricity, it is clear that public ownership is the weaker 
constraint.28 
Resolution or Step-in Rights.  
Large firms with potential market power are difficult to regulate for a whole host 
of reasons from asymmetric information to the ability to funnel resources from 
regulated to unregulated activities.  One difficulty is that the regulated firm may take 
on excessive leverage and use its inability to raise additional funds for vital 
infrastructure investment to argue that it should receive lenient regulatory treatment. 
Similarly, the firm might undertake risky diversification, end up in financial or other 
difficulties and request a price increase to fund such errors.  Since many regulated 
firms with market power provide important services essential to the everyday 
functioning of the economy, if these firms were to be become bankrupt or 
unexpectedly stop supplying services – even for a short time - then this could have 
substantial adverse effects on the economy.  Thus the regulated firm is in a strong 
bargaining position when it asks the regulator for a price increase, implicitly 
threatening bankruptcy and discontinuity of service if it is not granted. 
In order to level the regulatory playing field when the state-owned firm is 
privatised one option would be to allow the regulator to step in, run the firm and 
dispose of the assets as the regulator saw fit, if the regulated entity failed to meet the 
conditions set out in its license.29   Of course, the regulator would not be required to 
run the regulated firm itself; it could appoint a trustee.  One such model is that applied 
by the Irish financial regulator, which recently appointed a trustee to run Quinn 
Insurance where there were concerns about the financial viability of the firm.30  A 
                                                 
28 On electricity see, for example, Article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity, of 13 July 2009. 
29 The license might for example set out a programme of investment that is expected and as well as the 
regulatory regime that will be imposed in the regulated entity.  If the regulated entity is unable to meet 
the investment programme because it has incurred too much debt then step in rights might be invoked.  
Of course, holders of debt would be aware of this possible problem and thus this acts as a disincentive 
for the regulated entity to market such debt. 
30 Quinn Insurance Limited (“QIL”), a major Irish insurer, was according to the Financial Regulator 
involved in serious and persistent breaches of its solvency requirements.  As a result the Financial 
Regulator, in the interests of policyholders, applied to the High Court in March 2010 for the 
appointment of joint administrators to manage the insurer.  Subsequently QIL consented to these 
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similar option is to put in place some form of Special Administration regime, whereby 
continuity of service may be better protected than it would be in standard bankruptcy 
proceedings.31 
One of the implications of the above approach to privatising any state assets is that 
the price will be lower than it otherwise would be.  Monopolies, even publicly owned, 
tend to be worth more than if divided into a series of smaller firms required to 
compete with each other.  Equally, removal of entry controls will increase 
competition and likely lower the returns from asset sales.  On the other hand, changes 
that reduce the constraints on management (with respect to workers, sourcing input, 
investment and so on) will increased the market value of the firm.  The terms of 
reference for the Group envisage other factors being taken into account and hence the 
above considerations are relevant. 
Barriers to Reform: Compensating the Losers? 
No matter how thorough the analyses of whether a state-owned firm should 
remain in public ownership some will argue against the sale of assets to the private 
sector.  The sale might be characterised as needlessly selling off the family silver, 
either because the price is too low with the current depressed state of the economy or 
on principle.  Alternatively those that manage and work for state-owned firms may 
argue against the sale of such firms, because they may currently benefit from the 
present arrangements.  However, unlike the first group, those employed in state-
owned firms have the power to resist the transfer of state assets to the private sector 
through strikes and other action.  Attempts to franchise out bus routes in Dublin in 
2002 were abandoned after the bus unions objected while the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions (“ICTU”)32 stated, together with reforms of CIE, franchising would threaten 
the survival of social partnership (Massey, 2006, p.1).  These groups are likely to 
make change difficult.  They are concentrated and well organised, while the 
beneficiaries of change – society at large through a more efficient allocation of 
resources and a more competitive economy – are dispersed and much less effective at 
organising.  Furthermore the State has created institutional mechanisms – Employee 
Share Ownership Plans (“ESOP”) which also make privatisation more difficult.   
                                                                                                                                            
appointments. For details see the Financial Regulator’s website: 
http://www.financialregulator.ie/Pages/home.aspx.  Accessed 10 September 2010. 
31 See, for example. Helm (2008). 
32 The ICTU is an umbrella grouping representing trade unions. For further information see its website: 
http://www.ictu.ie/about/.  Accessed 10 September 2010. 
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Rent collection.  
Firms with durable market power are able to charge a price above the competitive 
level without attracting entry to compete away that price/cost margin, where the 
margin includes a normal rate of return. Indeed, that is the definition of market power.  
Frequently the rent – the difference between the competitive and the monopoly return 
- is captured in part by labour through higher wages and/or inefficient work and other 
practices.  In the case of ESB its labour costs would appear to be substantially above 
those of electricity systems where there is more competition, while there is also 
evidence of over manning (Deloitte, 2005; Diffney et al, 2009).  Transferring these 
functions to the private sector while at the same time introducing mechanisms such as 
those suggested above to facilitate greater competition means that these rents will be 
competed away.33  Under these conditions employees and management, which is also 
likely to be sharing in these rents, will strongly resist a simultaneously switch in 
ownership and competitive conditions.  Furthermore, Ministers who are able to 
influence the behaviour of the state-owned firms as a method for implementing their 
policy preferences – particularly in depressed times – may be reluctant to support 
privatisation.   
Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs).   
While rent collecting by labour and others is nothing unusual in advanced 
countries when it comes to state-owned enterprises, the creation of Employee Share 
Ownership Plans or ESOPs are by all accounts unique to Ireland.  ESOPs are owned 
by the employees of the state-owned firm and on occasion are entitled to nominate a 
member to the board.34 The ESOP is awarded shares in the state-owned firm either 
free or at a substantial discount.35  In some instances the ESOP is created when the 
state-owned firm is privatised, where the shares held by the ESOP typically account 
for just under 15% of the company (Palcic & Reeves, 2004, Table 11, p. 20), or while 
it is still in state ownership, where the ESOP’s ownership is 5% or less.36  The sums 
                                                 
33 Of course, introducing market mechanisms to increase competition is likely to reduce if not eliminate 
rents irrespective of ownership; however, that does not necessarily prevent the return to capital be 
captured by labour, which would be much less likely under private compared to public ownership.  
34 See, for example, the ESOP for ESB. For details see: http://www.esbesop.ie/faq.html#14.  Accessed 
23 September 2010. 
35 For the ESOPs involved in privatised state-owned firms, 5% of the shares were given free in 
exchange for changes in work practices and voluntary redundancies, with the remaining 9.9% was 
purchased by the ESOP at a discounted price.  Palcic & Reeves (2004, p. 20).  
36 The percentage of the capital stock distributed is less for those state-owned firms which are still in 
public ownership.  In 2008 the ESOP for Bord Gais was incorporated and by 2009 accounted for 3.29% 
 16 
transferred, for selected privatisations up to 2002, are considerable: from €83,161 per 
ESOP member in the case of Eircom to €27,522 per ESOP member in the case of 
ACC Bank (ibid., Table 11, p. 20).  At least three issues arise with respect to the 
privatisation of state owned firms and ESOPs. 
First, it is not entirely clear what the rationale for this transfer of wealth from 
society at large to a select group of individuals who happen to be lucky enough to 
work for the state-owned firm.  It appears to consist of two parts: first, in return for 
work place changes and increased flexibility (ibid, p. 20);37 and second, a payment 
not to attempt to block privatisation.  It is not at all clear how close is the relationship 
between the value of the shares awarded free to the ESOP and the value of the 
increased flexibility, since in all the ESOPs analysed by Palcic and Reeves (ibid., 
p.20) bar one, 5% of shares of the privatised firm are allocated for this purpose.  The 
same percentage was awarded in the case of the ESB ESOP although the percentage 
was a little lower for the Bord Gais ESOP (3.29%).  Recall that the employees of the 
state-owned firm are likely to be already collecting a wage premium and/or have 
restrictive practices so it not clear that these awards are appropriate.   
Second, ESOPs lead to a reduction in the return for the exchequer when the 
firm is sold.  This is in two parts: the awarding of free and discounted shares; and 
subsequently favourable tax treatment of the ESOP when the newly privatised firm 
acquired by another firm.38  Third, ESOPs have a considerable influence over the 
running of the newly privatised firm as well as existing state-owned firms.  The 
ESOPs incentives may not always be aligned with management in terms of improving 
efficiency and competitiveness.  As a result ESOPs may affect the market for 
corporate control.  The discipline that comes from the threat of takeover may be 
weaker than it otherwise would be.39 
Thus the Group will need to carefully consider whether the continued transfer 
of public assets together with future constraints on management are merited in any 
                                                                                                                                            
of its capital stock.  This was given in return for “transformational savings” (Bord Gais, 2010, p. 7).  In 
contrast the ESOP for ESB own 5% of the capital stock of the state-owned company. The ESOP was 
part of the Cost and Competitiveness Review agreed between the Government, ESB management and 
the ESB group of unions in 1996.  Legislation creating the ESOP was passed in 2001 enabling the roll 
out of the ESOP.  For further details see: http://www.esbesop.ie/index.html.  Accessed 7 September 
2010.  
37 See also previous footnote. 
38 This has been the record with respect to Eircom.  
39 For example, the Employee Share Ownership Trust of Aer Lingus voted against a takeover bid from 
Ryanair; see http://www.rte.ie/news/2006/1122/aerlingus.html. 
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future privatisation.  In our view it is difficult to justify such a transfer of assets, 
especially in the midst of a recession with public expenditure subject to extreme 
pressures.  Any transfers to ESOPs in exchange for flexibility should reflect the value 
of these concessions, determined by an independent source, taking into account any 
wage premium already present.   There should be no bribes for the switch of assets 
from the public to the private sector. 
 
4. Intangible Assets: Property Rights 
Introduction 
Intangible assets such as radio spectrum licences, mobile phone licences, oil 
drilling permits, wind turbine permits40 and carbon dioxide emission permits are 
likely to be valuable property rights.  So are brand recognition and know-how.  This 
reflects their scarcity value. Demand exceeds supply, which is limited for 
technological, public policy, geological, economic or social reasons.  The issue thus 
becomes how to allocate these scarce resources.  Three options are considered: 
auctions; beauty contests; and, free allocation.  The discussion suggests that auctions, 
suitable designed, are the most appropriate solution for allocating intangible assets. 
Auctions 
Typically scarce resources, whether it is an Auguste Renoir or a Jack Yeats 
painting or the right to drill for oil and gas in the North Sea, are sold to the highest 
bidder.  This reflects their scarcity value.  Any price less than this implies a transfer 
from the seller to the buyer, in the case of publicly owned property rights, from the 
State to the oil exploration firm or the radio station operator or the mobile phone 
operator.  The UK Government, for example, auctions carbon allowances under the 
EU ETS to the highest bidder, because it “is consistent with providing value for 
money to the taxpayer, subject to the process being transparent, resilient and secure” 
DEFRA, 2007).41  Perhaps the most famous example of an auction by a government 
was the UK auction of 3G telecom licences, which raised Stg£22.5 billion or 2.5% of 
                                                 
40 Wind is a common property resource that is the property of the people of Ireland.  It is a scarce 
resource since some sites are better than others and, as such, is likely to command a positive price, 
particularly in view of the assumption by electricity consumers of the downside risk in the price of 
wind-generated electricity through the REFIT programme which, in 2010/11, cost consumers €29 
million (CER, 2010, p. 18).  In addition, there is a possibility that wind generated electricity may be 
exported from Ireland to Great Britain with the rents from wind accruing to the owners of the right to 
generate wind power, not consumers or taxpayers in Ireland.   
41 Note that Ireland has irreversibly foregone the right to auction emission permits until 2012, when the 
right to auction permits is the responsibility of the EU. 
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UK GNP or enough to build 400 hospitals.  Germany was also successful in raising 
substantial sums in its 3G auction (Binmore & Klemperer, 2002). 
Designing an auction requires careful attention to the way it is structured such 
that the desired outcome is reached.  The 3G auction referred to above employed a 
team of experts to design the auction with considerable success.  Other countries were 
less successful in their design.  Nevertheless, there is substantial expertise and 
experience to draw on with respect to the theory (e.g., Klemperer, 2004) and practice 
(e.g. Matthes & Neuhoff, 2007 on carbon permit auctions).  It should be noted that in 
designing auctions, as with the discussion above on state-owned firms, attention needs 
to be paid to competition issues.  For example, if a market is dominated by a small 
number of players then there might be a case for reserving one slot for a new entrant; 
this also has the advantage that it might make it more difficult for the existing players 
to game the auction. 
Recently the Commission for Communications Regulation (“ComReg”), 
which regulates telecommunications in Ireland, issued a consultation paper on the 
allocation of 900 and 1800 MHz spectrum in which different types of auctions are 
proposed (ComReg, 2009).  The final outcome is however, dependent on the 
consultation process.  In any event this is in contrast to the beauty parade combined 
with administrative fee option selected with respect to the allocation of 3G licenses 
earlier in the decade and discussed below. 
Beauty Contests or Parades42 
Scarce rights can be allocated on the basis of what is sometimes referred to as 
a beauty parade.  This is akin to a form of barter.  Some non-price criteria are set out 
for the awarding of the property right possibly combined with a minimum payment. 
The criteria might include some things thought worthy from a public policy point of 
view or at least the preferences of the body awarding the property right.  However, 
these need to be weighed and each contestant needs to evaluated, a potentially time 
consuming and opaque process that can easily lead to charges of favouritism and 
corruption.  Furthermore beauty contests, when combined with an administrative fee, 
are likely to result in considerable forgone revenue compared to an auction.   Five of 
the seven EU countries that auctioned 3G licences earned more, after adjusting for 
population size, than the €249 million administrative fee that Ireland earned as part of 
                                                 
42 See Binmore & Klemperer (2002, pp. C76-C77) and NAO (2001, p. 44). 
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its beauty parade.43  The amount earned depended on auction design (UK vs. 
Netherlands) and the timing in relation to the internet stock bubble (UK & Germany 
vs. Switzerland & Belgium).   
Free Allocation 
The third alternative is simply to give the asset away free.  While this is 
perhaps unusual, there are nevertheless some instances of this.  For example, under 
the EU ETS Member States can elect to auction off 10% of the allowances.  Ireland 
chose not to, with the result that the forgone revenue in 2008 would have been €36 
million (Gorecki et al, 2009, p. 25).44  It is not obvious why valuable assets should be 
given away free.  To the extent that there are some implicit criteria for allocating these 
property rights then they fall into the same category as beauty contests. 
Intangible Assets and Tangible Assets 
In some instances, government agencies and quasi-governmental organisations 
have build up a considerable amount of know-how and substantial brand recognition 
in delivering a range of services to (parts of) the public. Incorporation of such 
agencies and organisations would instantly improve the government’s balance sheet.45 
It would also open the door to a discussion which services are primarily in the public 
interest – and should therefore be financed from the public purse and perhaps 
provided by a state-owned company – and which serve primarily private interests – 
and therefore should recover a share of their costs through fees, be mutualised, or 
privatised. Examples include the sales promotion activities of Bord Bia and Failte 
Ireland; and the consulting services of and the Sustainable Energy Authority of 
Ireland and Teagasc, the Irish Agriculture and Food Development Authority. 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 ComReg awarded three 3G licenses in 2002 with a present value of €175 million.  The nominal value 
was €279.3 million.  In 2005 a fourth licence was issued, bring the total raised to €249 million in 
present value terms or €393.6 million in nominal terms. (Based on various ComReg press releases (e.g, 
Director of Telecommunications Regulation (2002)), Annual Reports and discussions).  In the UK the 
3G licences yielded about €670 per head, Germany €620, Italy €220, Netherlands €180, Austria €90, 
Belgium €50, and Switzerland €30 (NAO, 2001, Figure 7, p. 19, which refers to licences issued up to 
March 2001).  Ireland’s population in 2002 was 3.9 million, with revenue per head of €64, higher than 
Belgium but lower than Austria. 
44 In 2010, emissions regulated by the EU ETS amount to about 15 million tonnes of carbon dioxide; 
the current spot price is €14/tCO2. 
45 Note that this may not reduce borrowing costs if potential lenders deduct the now-explicit assets 
from the implicit assets. 
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5. Conclusions 
  The debate over the potential saleability of certain tangible and intangible 
assets owned by the state turns into much more than an exercise in ranking these 
assets by commercial viability and value.  Careful attention needs to be devoted to 
ensuring that wider public policy considerations are taken into account, such 
competition, regulation and economic development. Hence it is important to 
formulate terms of reference for any consideration of the sale of state assets that 
reflect these wider concerns. 
In the case of tangible assets – commercial state firms – the debate is around 
whether these firms should be the public sector and whether the objectives can be 
better met by alternative arrangements.  In privatising these state-owned firms careful 
attention needs to be paid to ensure that markets are well organised and competitive. 
This may necessitate for example breaking up a vertically integrated firm into its 
competitive and monopoly parts.  To a considerable degree the debate over 
privatisation reflects issues related to the regulatory reform agenda.  But in both cases 
what is on offer is a more efficient and competitive economy if reform is conducted 
sensibly and is not derailed by vested interests as has been the case, on occasion, in 
the past.  
In terms of intangible assets such as permits of various kinds such a those 
relating to carbon emissions, wind turbines and oil exploration as well as radio 
spectrum licences, the conclusion is much more straightforward: these assets should 
be auctioned off to the highest bidder, but using a carefully designed auction which 
needs to take into account the competitive situation amongst the bidders not only to 
prevent collusion and gaming, but also to encourage entry and competition.  Another 
important reason to auction these assets is that there is a danger, absent auctioning, 
that government will be unaware that these are valuable assets and hence not properly 
price them when making public policy decisions.  
 
. 
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